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1Introduction1
Anti-corruption rhetoric appears to be on the rise among politicians and governments in both
the North and the South, often as lip-service response to the increasing activism of civil
society and the actions taken by some international agencies to fight corruption. This does not
mean that no country and institution have undertaken serious efforts against corruption. But
there are many whose commitment to addressing the problem is rather dubious. It is therefore
important to be aware of the fact that the fight against corruption can present few success
stories (Kaufmann, 1999). The only clear-cut successes have been Hong Kong and Singapore,
both city-states that had fairly authoritarian governments when they initiated their anti-
corruption efforts. A few other countries, including Italy and Mexico have made inroads on
corruption but have by no means destroyed the problem. However, recent years have also
experienced several setbacks. In Uganda, for instance, corruption seems to be on the rise, and
its ranking in Transparency International’s corruption index now remains far below even
Africa’s gloomy average.
Plotting the evolution of the corruption index over time by regions of the world (using simple
averages of the countries belonging to the respective region), shows that Latin America and
South Asia have experienced a decline in overall perceived corruption during the last decade,
while Western Europe, North America, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle
East have experienced an increase during the same period (Lederman & Soares, 2001). These
data, combined with recent scandals in Britain, France, the European Union and Norway
clearly show that corruption is not an exclusive phenomenon in developing countries.
Moreover, countries with almost the same level of economic development exhibit enormous
differences in the levels of corruption; compare, for instance, Ghana and Tanzania, and the
Netherlands and Belgium. Models linking corruption solely with the degree of economic
development cannot explain these facts (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). Nor are they fully
captured by institutional differences (Hauk & Marti, 1999).
There are still many aspects of the phenomenon corruption we only know poorly, including:
                                                  
1 This note is an extended version of a paper presented at the ‘Third Conference of the Parliamentary
Network on the World Bank’ (PnoWB), Bern, Switzerland, 9-11 May 2002. Useful comments on earlier
drafts were received from Aslak Orre. Points of view and any remaining errors can be attributed to the
author.
2· Why have so many anti-corruption campaigns failed?
· What are the necessary criteria for sustainable corruption control?
· How to design and implement anti-corruption strategies and concrete actions that are
likely to have sustainable results?
Thus, before designing and implementing a detailed anti-corruption strategy a major
challenge for reformers is to ask the ‘right’ questions and to make the right priorities based on
country specific characteristics. The purpose of this note is therefore not to give ready-made
answers, but to raise some questions that need to be dealt with in the further process, and to
outline some challenges for Parliamentarians in the fight against corruption.
Actions against corruption
In spite of recent setbacks and the fact that corruption and bribery seem to be growing in
some countries and regions, there are still reasons to be optimistic about initiatives to curb
corruption. For instance, recognition that corruption is a problem is far more widespread
today compared to just a few years ago. Civil society is mobilising in many places, and the
international community has been increasingly willing to take action. In particular, the role of
Transparency International has been important in raising public awareness on the issue.
There are at least four reasons for being mildly optimistic with respect to the outcome of the
fight:
1. First, to the extent that corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain, its
perpetrators have one foot in the official world. They are thus within the reach of
incentives or threats – such as removal from office – that may persuade them to change
their behaviour.
2. Second, since corruption usually creates economic inefficiencies and hampers growth,
there is a beginning realisation that corrupt countries tend to lose out in the international
competition for capital and aid. Therefore, businesspeople and financiers in developing
countries hit by collapsing economies now demand more than a minister’s blessing before
they risk money.
33. Third, corruption is now an issue that brings the crowds out on the streets. For once,
protesters in Harare, Manila, Nairobi, Jakarta and elsewhere are on the same side as the
IMF and the World Bank.
4. Fourth, a number of politicians and senior civil servants have been prosecuted and
convicted for corruption in, for instance, Peru, Tanzania and France. Moreover, several
staff members of multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and UNICEF have
been suspended or fired due to corruption.
Corruption must be fought on many fronts. To succeed requires looking at the fundamental
causes of corruption in depth and with open minds, avoiding counterproductive biases. This
also requires open-mindedness with respect to the weaknesses of political institutions, and to
seriously consider the possible role of politicians involved – directly or indirectly - in
corruption.
Political corruption
Political parties and elections are key factors in facilitating corruption in some countries.
Many political parties are organised and run in a highly authoritarian and unaccountable
fashion, producing leaders who then approach their work in government in a similar way.
Likewise, many election campaigns establish a pattern of vote buying, which then becomes
the routine for politicians once in office. In some countries, election as a Member of
Parliament (MP) is viewed as a ‘license to loot’.2 In Russia and Ukraine, for instance,
criminal groups and mafias have sought election to Parliament simply to avoid prosecution
based on parliamentary immunity. This propensity to make ‘rent seeking’ a main political
occupation is reinforced by executive domination that often leaves little space for ordinary
parliamentarians to carry out their legislative, oversight and representative functions in ways
that respect and strengthen good governance values of accountability, transparency and
participation.3
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3 The Canadian Parliamentary Centre provides practical guidelines to parliamentarians on the issue of
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4The key challenge for MPs is to make the executive accountable. But to establish credible
anti-corruption measures, parliamentarians have to start with themselves and show that the
new rules of the game also apply to them.
Relevant policy measures may include:
· Political parties should be obliged to report and publish how they are funded.
· Independent bodies should audit these reports.
· Periodic public declarations of assets and income sources by MPs, ministers and
government officials - and at time by their dependants.
· In some countries it might also be required to reconsider parliamentarians’ immunity
against criminal prosecution.
State capture
In transition economies corruption has taken on a new image - that of so-called oligarchs
manipulating policy formation and even shaping laws and regulations to their own substantial
advantage by ‘buying’ politicians and state officials.4 Various forms of ‘state capture’ are
observed in connection with, for instance, privatisation programmes and tax reforms. In some
countries there are markets for tax exemptions. Other forms of state capture include: (1) the
sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to private interests; (2) the sale of Presidential decrees to
private interests; (3) the sale of court decisions in criminal cases; (4) the sale of court
decisions in commercial cases; and (5) illicit contributions paid by private interest to political
parties and election campaigns. Because powerful business people and firms use their
influence to block any policy reforms that might eliminate these advantages, state capture has
become not merely a symptom but also a fundamental cause of poor governance in some
countries. In particular, this has been observed in transition economies in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, but also in some Latin American countries.
Once the captured economy has become entrenched, how can the country break out of the
vicious circle? Fostering competition in the economy and in the marketplace for political
influence is the main challenge in preventing and combating state capture (Hellman &
Kaufmann, 2001). There is broad agreement on the steps to achieve reform, such as
restructuring monopolies to increase competition, encouraging trade, and fostering a more
                                                  
4 An empirical investigation of state capture is found in Hellman et al. (2000).
5favourable business environment, also for smaller and medium sized enterprises. But although
the general solutions might be well known, the bottleneck is often to formulate concrete
reform measures and get them adopted and implemented. Moreover, in many countries there
is a need for clarifying and enforcing conflict-of-interest rules.
Another challenge is to co-ordinate the actions of the vast majority of constituencies that lose
from the capture economy while only a small elite gain. Mobilising small and medium sized
enterprises, consumers and other interest groups, and enhancing their collective voice to
counterbalance the economic elite can be powerful instruments in weakening the foundation
of the captured economy.
Corruption in international business
Foreign investors can be – and often are - part of the problem. Experiences with multi-
nationals during the last few decades clearly show that measures are required to take actions
to alter the incentives of foreign businesses and to promote social responsibility by foreign-
based corporations where they invest. This requires international co-ordination.
The OECD’s anti-bribery convention of 1997 aims to stop ‘grand’ corruption at its source –
i.e., the multinational companies that bribe their way to contracts, mainly in poor countries,
but also in the West. Some cynics argue that the convention merely encourages Western firms
to bribe more cleverly. For instance, loopholes exist such as trips to Disneyland on fat
expense accounts and financing scholarships at prestigious universities for the corrupt
officials’ offspring. Politicians should address such loopholes. Moreover, foreign subsidiaries
can also bribe, so long as their Western headquarters are not in on it. And when a briber is a
foreign agent – as he often is – it can be desperately hard to pin the responsibility on him.
Even Finland, which is considered to be the most advanced in implementing the OECD
convention, has yet to bring a single criminal case involving the bribery of a foreign public
official (The Economist , 2 March 2002:70).5
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6But the OECD’s new rules may prove effective. They require countries to help each other to
prosecute cases. Since each country has an interest in preventing others from stealing an
advantage by bribery, they all have an incentive to monitor each other’s adherence to the new
convention. In particular, the further pursuit of corporate bribery will require prosecutors to
take a fresh look at the behaviour of their highly respected local companies when operating
outside their home market. This will involve a reappraisal of investigative techniques, in
particular with regard to the collection of evidence from abroad.  Furthermore, there are signs
that some businesses are acquiring the anti-bribery instinct. For instance, Uniliver, a big
consumer-products company, pulled out of Bulgaria rather than paying bribes. Moreover,
United Technology, an American multinational company that makes Otis lifts and Sikorsky
helicopters experienced that its market share and profitability increased when the company
fired the president of a foreign subsidiary for making gifts to foreign officials (The Economist ,
2 March 2002:70). Thus, the myth that a company which does not pay bribes in developing
countries will not do business, has to be revised.
Now that the OECD’s governments are promising to punish cheaters, more companies may
choose honesty. However, if it becomes evident that (some) OECD governments either is not
effective in enforcing the convention or is practising favouritism toward special interests, one
will expect cynicism as well as bribery to increase.
Furthermore, international efforts against money laundering need to be strengthened. There are
clear links between corruption and money laundering. And increasingly money laundering is
connected with international organised crime. The social and economic consequences of this
private-to-private corruption involving the international financial industry is extremely serious,
and may have contagious effects on public sector corruption. There is an urgent need for
politicians to establish and enforce international conventions to tackle these issues.
Some policy measures to consider are:
· Banish secret accounts.
· Establish international standards for bank accounts, including that full identity is required
when opening new accounts.
· Ease the rules for confiscating money which cannot be accounted for.
7· Establish international agreements and mechanisms for the repatriation of illegally acquired
wealth in foreign banks.
· Strengthen the economic police and facilitate co-operation between the economic police of
various countries.
Is foreign aid a part of the problem?
In many poor countries donors are the major driving force in public sector and structural
reforms. They contribute substantial funds and technical assistance to most reform initiatives,
often linked to specific demands for particular institutional changes. Donor influence on the
design, scope and sequencing of reforms is therefore substantial. However, in a
comprehensive study on the role of government in adjusting economies, Batley (1999)
concludes that public sector reform programmes pushed by donors and emphasising
technocratic solutions, have led to increased bureaucratic power without a strengthening of
the accountability of the bureaucracy (managers) to politicians and the public. Donors, by the
means they use to promote development, may thereby undermine democracy and good
governance.
Thus, international agencies and donor governments bear a heavy responsibility for
weakening genuine accountability in poor countries by insisting that the key accountability
relationship is between donors and recipient governments rather than between governments
and citizens. It seems to be the case in many aid dependent countries that recipient
governments are more accountable to the donor agencies than to their own citizens.
Moreover, donors, often governed by disbursement goals have ballooning budgets for various
projects and programmes. The push to spend makes it difficult for donors to monitor or
evaluate adequately the quality of their assistance. In particular, tied aid in the form of export
credit schemes have been notorious sources for bribery and kickbacks. Furthermore, donors’
tendency to move into new areas and activities at the same time add to the problem of too
much aid chasing too little absorptive capacity. The consequence is poor control with how the
money is spent and huge opportunities for corruption. A secure source of foreign aid can be
like a diamond mine from which corrupt officials and politicians can extract rents. Few
donors, however, are willing to admit that they have weak control over their spending, as they
do not want to be seen as supporting non-performing and corrupt activities.
8The prescription of ‘good governance’ through improved accountability and transparency
should be introduced in the donor agencies as well. To address the question of corruption,
donors ought to focus on their own role in contributing to the problem. To establish
credibility, more openness about weaknesses in the aid system is needed. The non-
governmental organisation Transparency International regularly publishes a corruption
perception index, ranking countries according to their levels of corruption. There seems to be
a need for an index ranking donor agencies according to similar criteria, to make the public
more informed and the agencies more accountable about this important issue.
Still there are a number of important issues that need to be addressed by parliamentarians
from donor countries, including:
· How to improve co-ordination between donors? This issue has been discussed within
OECD-DAC for the last decades, but the progress is very slow.
· Abolish tied aid in the form of export credit schemes. The British government’s efforts to
reduce tied aid, should be acknowledged.
· More flexibility in transfering unspent budget componets from one year to the next to
avoid the annual Christmas-spending spree.
· How to make transparency the “golden rule” of the new international aid system? In this
respect, the World Bank’s use of internet should be commended. Why not put all
information on projects, programmes, budget support etc. out on the world wide web?
· Imagine; a ‘transparency index’ for donors?
Political will and trust
To defeat public sector corruption the distinction between private preference and public duty
must be enforced. Much of the task involves instructing institutions about their public duties
and then giving them the appropriate incentives, such as higher salaries. It is, however,
important to stress that wage incentives will only function in combination with other
measures, including credible policies of monitoring and punishment. Furthermore, the
judiciary should be shielded from political influence, and politicians from the temptations that
come with the need to pay for election campaigns. In developing countries, the international
community may assist such reform processes by contributing in building institutions.
9However, Parliamentarians, international donor agencies and other reformers will not achieve
much unless the ordinary people most affected by corruption take up the fight themselves.
The best remedy may not come from judges but from information. When people are given
access to the facts that affect their welfare through the media, internet etc., this may contribute
to reduce the public tolerance of corruption and encouraging citizens to actively report and
provide evidence of corruption. Politicians and public servants may, thus, think twice about
breaking their trust. Increased transparency and focus on corruption may, therefore, reduce the
incidence of corruption by increasing the moral and stigma costs of corrupt behaviour, and by
raising the risk of being detected. Grassroots ‘watchdog’ organisations can play an important
role in this context. But if nothing is done in practice to curb corruption in spite of increased
information this may lead to increased frustration and cynicism among the general public. If
cynicism sets in after non-performing anti-corruption campaigns, this will most likely lead to
increased corruption.
Consequently, the successful implementation of anti-corruption efforts requires political will
and commitment at the highest levels of government and, thereby implicitly also by MPs.
However, when the level of corruption is high and nothing is done to punish corrupt leaders,
public confidence in the political and administrative leadership is undermined. If leaders are
corrupt, this may also “legitimise” lower level corruption.
Concluding remarks
What can Parliamentarians do to fight corruption?
The simple answer to this question is:
· Be honest! Do not accept bribes.
· Second, think global – act local. Different anti-corruption measures are required in
different countries. But, international co-ordination of anti-corruption measures is also
required, including measures to strengthening the OECD-convention and to fight money
laundering.
· Third, be ambitious - but realistic. It is important to recognise that the challenge of
fighting corruption should not be used as an opportunity to expand the reform agenda
beyond what is feasible, but rather to prioritise that agenda more effectively by developing
10
a clearer sense of the factors that prevent further institutional reforms. The main task of
parliamentarians is to make the executive accountable.
· Fourth, education is crucial. At least one general lesson can be drawn from the anti-
corruption measures in Hong Kong where public attitudes against corruption have
changed dramatically during the last decades. A main component of the Hong Kong
reform programme was to ‘build a strong altruism and a sense of responsibility in oneself
and toward the others’, de-emphasising the importance of getting money and getting
ahead at the expense of others (Hauk & Marti, 1999:3). Thus, education and information
on the economic, political and social costs of corruption are key elements in reducing
corruption successfully in the longer term.
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Summary
This note outlines some challenges facing parliamentarians
in the fight against corruption. To succeed, it is argued,
requires open-mindedness with respect to the weaknesses of
political institutions, and to seriously consider the possible role
of politicians in fuelling corruption.
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